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Abstract. The Russian Federation has been carrying out long-term and successful disin-
formation and propaganda activities against Ukraine. Due to its powerful, state-supported 
media structures, it is able to impose its vision of reality on its respective audiences. The 
purpose of this article is to determine the lexemes and topics of the “landscape” of an-
alytical reports produced by Russia Today (RT) in 2018–2020. Lexemes and topics lay 
the groundwork for the RT propaganda discourse aimed at interfering and disbalancing 
Ukraine’s media space. This paper, based on quantitative and qualitative analysis, focuses 
on (1) the vocabulary structure of analytical materials, which may indicate Russian priori-
ties, and (2) the thematic content (hidden topics) of RT messages. The RT analytical reports 
titles and relevant metadata were analyzed. The body of data was subdivided into periods 
of presidencies of P. Poroshenko and V. Zelensky. The authors argue that personalities 
do not play a significant role in the Kremlin’s attitude toward Ukraine; only the Ukraine-
Russia opposition is decisive, in which the RF assigns Ukraine the only acceptable role as 
Russia’s “puppet.”
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space model, topic modeling. 
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Dominuojančios koncepcijos Rusijos Federacijos  
propagandoje prieš Ukrainą (turinio ir kolokacinė  
„Russia Today“ analizė)
Santrauka. Rusijos Federacija vykdė ir tebevykdo ilgalaikę dezinformacijos ir propagan-
dos kampaniją prieš Ukrainą, todėl jos įtakingos ir valstybės remiamos medijos leidžia 
primesti savą tikrovės viziją. Šio straipsnio siekis yra nustatyti leksemas ir temas, kurias 
naudojo „Russia Today“ (RT) savo analitinėse ataskaitose 2018–2020 metais. Šios lekse-
mos ir temos yra RT propagandos diskurso pagrindas, siekiant paveikti ir pakeisti Ukrainos 
medijų erdvę. Siekiant šio tikslo, pasitelkus kiekybinę ir kokybinę analizę, įgyvendinami 
šie uždaviniai: 1) tiriama analitinių straipsnių žodyno struktūra, kuri leidžia matyti Rusijos 
prioritetus, ir 2) analizuojamas teminis RT siunčiamų žinučių turinys. Tyrimo medžiaga 
buvo padalyta į Piotro Porošenkos ir Vladimiro Zelenskio prezidentavimo metu pateik-
tas žinutes. Autorių teigimu, prezidento asmuo nėra svarbus formuojant RT diskursą apie 
Ukrainą; priešpriešinant Ukrainos ir Rusijos vaidmenis siekiama suformuoti nuomonę, kad 
Ukraina tegali būti Rusijos „marionetė“.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: propaganda, „Russia Today“, analitinės ataskaitos, žodžių maišo 
modelis, erdvinių vektorių modelis, temų modeliavimas.
Introduction
We perceiveour reality through the images framed by language. Facts 
are represented in pictures and become communicable as models of 
reality. The sphere of language and the physical reality are differ-
ent dimensions; consequently, this discrepancy may provoke societal 
problems arising from communication misunderstandings, which 
are a wrong or ambiguous representation of the reality.1 Images are 
created by the mass media, which has the power to influence large 
audiences and form mass beliefs, moods, desires for action or inac-
tion, etc. Mass media is a part of the media space (public in nature) 
that modern interpretations differentiate from the Habermasian un-
derstanding of public space2 as a sphere of rational debate among 
equal subjects for reaching a consensus. Specifically, the media space 
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge and Ke-
gan Paul, 1974. Statement 2.12), 9.
2 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1989).
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is considered as a space where conceptual ideals are repackaged and 
promoted for the demands of a particular social class.3
This idea is especially relevant in the Ukrainian oligarchic media 
space, where de jure independent pluralistic media companies are de 
facto owned by individual tycoons (who finance and support certain 
political forces) and, accordingly, impose the visions of their owners 
on internal and external events. However, in Ukraine there is a much 
greater threat from its eastern neighbour, i.e. Russia. The regulation 
of the Ukrainian media space has been going on since Ukraine’s in-
dependence and has been gaining special importance since 2014, 
when the Russian aggression against Ukraine began. In the media 
space of Ukraine, the media of the Russian Federation carry out 
active information and propaganda activities and, despite certain re-
strictions and prohibitions, have the opportunity to form a one-sided 
pro-Russian reality. In fact, information and comments predetermine 
the society’s further actions, attitudes and perceptions of politicians, 
events, reforms, and politics in general.
We assume, as a hypothesis, that pro-Kremlin media reports are 
dominated by certain concepts that lay the “framework” for the per-
ception of Ukrainian reality and serve as a signaling system for prior-
ity, perhaps vulnerable, topics for the RF political elite.  
The Soviet Union had extensive experience in using propaganda, 
disinformation, fakes, and subversive activities; the main task of the 
Soviet media was to support the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology 
by creating influential forms of propaganda4 and to reflect a Soviet-
ized version of reality.5 However, the key concept was outlined by 
3 Chris Berry, Janet Harbord and Rachel Moore, eds., Public Space, Media Space 
(Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), 4–12.
4 Fredrick S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories of the 
Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist 
Concepts of What the Press should be and do. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1956).
5 Sarah Oates, “The Neo-Soviet Model of the Media,” Europe-Asia Studies 59, no. 8 
(2007): 1279–1297.  
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Lenin, who described the press as a “not only collective propagandist 
and collective agitator, but collective organizer.”6
The RF, having declared itself the successor to the USSR, has ex-
panded the variety of tools at its disposal through digital technology. 
The crisis of liberal democracies, which have become less cohesive 
since the end of the Cold War, has only increased the potential for 
Russian propaganda and disinformation. In addition, in the digital 
age, the public turns out to be very vulnerable to the manipulation 
of information, half-truths, and conspiracy theories. However, it is 
worth mentioning that after the collapse of the USSR, Russia attemp-
ted to build a media network based on democratic media systems, but 
after Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the main task of the media was 
identified as support for the President’s efforts in restoring order and 
defending Russian interests.7 As a result, the media have come under 
state control and given clear guidelines on both what to discuss and 
what to keep quiet about.8
Today, disinformation and propaganda are a component of Rus-
sia’s “soft power” and a part of its security policy, including hybrid 
warfare. In 2012–2013, after being elected for his third term, Putin 
began using cyberattacks and disinformation to counter the “soft 
power” of the West and to compensate for the weakness of Russia’s 
own conventional strategy. Russia’s disinformation and propaganda 
strategy works on a trial-and-error basis and is clearly developed 
separately for each country or group, focusing on those narratives 
and unfortunate news that work best in a particular environment. The 
main goal is to discredit politicians, experts, institutions, and media 
6 Leo Gruliow, “The Soviet Press: Propagandist, Agitator, Organizer,” Journal of 
International Affair 10, no. 2 (1956): 153–169.
7 Jonathan Becker, “Lessons from Russia: A Neo-authoritarian Media System,” 
European Journal of Communication 19, no. 2 (2004): 139–163, https://doi.
org/10.1177/0267323104042908.
8 Peter Pomerantsev, “Authoritarianism Goes Global (II): The Kremlin’s Information 
War,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 4 (2015): 40–50, https://doi.org/10.1353/
jod.2015.0074.
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of the target countries and to create a one-sided pro-Russian reality.9 
Tools of such influence involve the media outlets RT, Sputnik, Ruptly, 
TASS.
Given this, the RT media outlet has been selected as the object of 
our study, namely: analytical reports on the RT site with the hashtag 
“#Ukraina” (https://russian.rt.com/trend/334986-ukraina). RT oper-
ates in the entire Russian-speaking space and influences those who 
work in it. However, we are interested in how this media outlet por-
trays or reacts to events and the political situation in Ukraine. 
The analysis involves two tasks: 1) to study RT’s vocabulary and 
to define its emphases regarding events in Ukraine; 2) to distinguish 
principal topics of RT messages determining the Kremlin’s “agenda.” 
It should be mentioned that we do not study the effects of media, i.e. 
how the Ukrainian society reacts to RT’s messages. This is a subject 
for separate analysis.
The main article body consists of three parts. The first chapter 
provides a brief overview of our choice of RT as the research object. 
The second chapter outlines the methodology that we have been us-
ing to conduct the study and to futher substantiate our findings, and 
the next chapter presents proofs of the defined hypothesis. The article 
ends with our main conclusions drawn from the empirical analysis.
1. Specificity of Russia Today 
Due to a number of reasons (including local influence, habits, use of 
the Russian language, natives of the Russian Federation among the 
audience, support for communist ideology, relative prevalence in the 
media etc.), Russian media outlets, including Russia Today, still hold 
a significant part of the media space of Ukraine. Therefore, these 
outlets have a certain level of influence on the political consciousness 
9 Stefan Meister, ed., Understanding Russian Communication Strategy: Case Studies 
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of Ukrainians, and propaganda, especially during the time of hybrid 
warfare of the RF against Ukraine, poses a threat to the security of 
the state.
Created in 2005 as an alternative to the Anglo-Saxon media en-
vironment, nowadays RT is accessible to about 700 million viwers 
all over the world (7 million in Europe). In its recent investigation 
(2017), the Intelligence Community Assessment reported that the 
Kremlin spends US$190 million a year on the distribution of the 
channel in hotels and via satellite and cable broadcasting all over 
the world.10 Backed by rich state financial support, RT’s messages 
are widely disseminated, cited, discussed, and have the capacity to 
influence public opinion and decision-makers. The Kremlin tries to 
turn Russia Today (as well as Sputnik, Ruptly, and TASS) into the 
world’s dominating information sources and has started to conclude 
partner agreements with the media all over the world to strengthen its 
positions11 (GUILDHALL 2020).
Being known as a home for controversial voices, RT nevertheless 
greatly influences the global media environment. On the one hand, it 
has provided a platform fro the likes of WikiLeaks’s Julian Assange, 
Holocaust denier Ryan Dawson, and Brexit leader Nigel Farage, but, 
on the other hand, RT hosts prominent media personalities like Larry 
King, Chris Hedges, and Ed Schultz.12,13 These individuals, in turn, 
use their industry status to interview high-profile guests who would 
10 ICA, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections: The Analytic 
Process and Cyber Incident Attribution. Intelligence Community Assessment, 2017, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.
11 GUILDHALL, Kak Kreml’ stroit mediakonglomerat i pytayetsya vtyanut’ strany mira 
v infoprostranstvo RF [How the Kremlin builds a Media Conglomerate and tries to 
draw the Countries of the World into the RF Infospace], May 15, 2020, https://ghall.
com.ua/2020/05/15/kak-kreml-stroit-mediakonglomerat-i-pytaetsya-vtyanut-strany-
mira-v-infoprostranstvo-rf/.
12 Mona Elswah and Philip N. Howard, “‘Anything that Causes Chaos’: The Organi-
zational Behavior of Russia Today (RT),” Journal of Communication 70 (2020): 623–
645.
13 Monica L. Richter, “What We Know about RT (Russia Today),” European Values 
(2017): 57, https://www.europeanvalues.cz/en/what-we-know-about-russia-today/.
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otherwise be out of league for the average RT journalist; in doing so, 
they help RT mask its propagandistic intentions and instead portray 
itself as a serious, reliable newscaster.14
In 2017, during a press conference with V. Putin, French President 
Emmanuel Macron described RT and Sputnik as “organs of influence, 
of propaganda and of lying propaganda.”15 However, it is not the 
only official criticism; the channel has been sanctioned several times 
by the UK’s Office of Communication for breaching the broadcasting 
code and is currently registered as an “agent of a foreign government” 
in the US.16,17 In early January, two weeks before Donald J. Trump 
took office, American intelligence officials released a declassified 
version of the report “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in 
Recent US Elections” (prepared jointly by the CIA, FBI and NSA) 
where the authors accused the Russian media of undermining public 
faith in the US democratic process, denigrating Secretary Clinton and 
harming her electability and potential presidency.18
In Europe RT is named explicitly as an agent of Russian disin-
formation: the Russian Government employs a wide range of tools 
and instruments, such as think tanks and special foundations (Russkiy 
Mir), special authorities (Rossotrudnichestvo), multilingual TV sta-
tions (RT), pseudo news agencies and multimedia services (Sputnik), 
14 Monica L. Richter, “The Kremlin’s Platform for ‘Useful Idiots’ in the West: An 
Overview of RT’s Editorial Strategy and Evidence of Impact”, European Values, 2017, 
https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/userfiles/the-kremlin-s-platform-for-useful-idiots-in-
the-west-an-overview-of-rt-s-editorial-strategy.pdf.
15 Michel Rose and Denis Dyomkin, “Macron denounces “lying Propaganda” of Russian 
Media as He meets Putin,” The Independent, May 29, 2017, https://www.independent.
co.uk/news/world/europe/vladimir-putin-emmanuel-macron-election-hacking-lying-
propaganda-meeting-a7762336.html.
16 Jim Waterson, “RT Fined ₤200,000 for Breaching Impartiality Rules,” The Guardian, 
July 26, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/jul/26/rt-fined-breaching-
impartiality-rules-ofcom.
17 Mona Elswah and Philip N. Howard, “‘Anything that Causes Chaos’: The Organiza-
tional Behavior of Russia Today (RT),” Journal of Communication 70 (2020): 623–
645.
18 ICA, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections: The Analytic 
Process and Cyber Incident Attribution. Intelligence Community Assessment, 2017, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.
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and cross-border social and religious groups, as the regime attempts 
to present itself as the only defender of traditional Christian values; 
its social media and internet trolls are to challenge democratic values, 
divide Europe, gather domestic support and create the perception of 
failed states in the EU’s eastern region.19
 Russia Today was an ambitious public diplomacy project initially 
established to present a positive image of Russia to the world. How-
ever, the dynamics of the channel’s news production changed con-
siderably during the Russia-Georgia war in 2008. Since then, RT has 
worked to encourage doubts about the West, its media, agenda, and 
values, epitomized in its slogan “Question More.”20
During the Russian-Ukrainian war, RT became a powerful tool 
for shaping Western attitudes toward Ukraine, the war, and Russia. 
German journalists call this influence “subtle” and therefore very 
dangerous. This “sophistication” lies in the fact that Moscow’s pro-
paganda resources are turning into a platform for a critical discussion 
in the West about the mistakes, shortcomings, and weaknesses of 
Ukraine and Western society as well.21
2. Methodology of the research
The study has analyzed analytical reports with the hashtag “#Ukraina” 
available on the RT website (https://russian.rt.com/trend/334986-
ukraina). These are 990 articles covering almost two years – from 
September 2018 (the site does not provide access to earlier materials) 
to April 2020. The whole period can be divided into 4 subperiods, 
each having its own specifics, and this specificity is manifested in 
19 European Parliament, EU Strategic Communication to counteract anti-EU Propagan-
da by Third Parties, 23 November 2016, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/docu-
ment/TA-8-2016-0441_EN.pdf?redirect.
20 Mona Elswah and Philip N. Howard, “‘Anything that Causes Chaos’: The Organiza-
tional Behavior of Russia Today (RT),” Journal of Communication 70 (2020): 623–645.
21 Danylo Bilyk, “Yak propahanda Kremlya vplyvaye na robotu nimets’kykh 
zhurnalistiv” [How Kremlin Propaganda affects the Work of German Journalists], 
Deutche Welle, April 1, 2015, https://www.dw.com/uk.
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changes in the direction of propaganda and article analytics content. 
The first two periods (September–December 2018 and January–April 
2019) fall into Petro Poroshenko’s presidency, with the second time-
frame representing the pre-election period, when the Russian propa-
ganda network anticipated the new President of Ukraine. The next 
two periods (May–December 2019 and January–April 2020) repres-
ent the time of the Presidency of Volodymyr Zelensky. During the 
months of May to December 2019, the Russian Federation, in ac-
cordance with the propagandists at Russia Today, closely anticipated 
the new head of the state, and during the next period, having made 
appropriate conclusions, continued to pursue its own propaganda 
policy in view of the new conditions.
 We have limited our research to the titles of the articles, which 
is quite sufficient for the purposes of the study as the titles of RT 
reports (1) clearly define the subject of the article analysis, (2) are 
always “seasoned” with propaganda clichés / labels, and (3) express 
the content in a concise form. All these factors allow us to identify 
the focus and general thematic “landscape” of Russian propaganda in 
the period under study. 
Each title is considered as a separate document consisting of lex-
emes, i.e. unigrams and bigrams. In general, the entire collection of 
documents forms an integral structural unit – the body of data.
In terms of methodology, our efforts were: 
• stage 1 (analysis of vocabulary structure) – to determine se-
mantic features of the body of data on the basis of aggregation, 
quantization and analysis of specific words / lexemes of the cor-
pus vocabulary and connections between them;
• stage 2 (structural-thematic analysis) – to construct a latent 
probabilistic structural thematic model of the collected docu-
ments. 
Preliminary processing of the original data included a standard 
methodology of text extraction: formation of the body of data, con-
version to lower case, deletion of punctuation, stemming, selection 
of words (basic lexemes), detection of bigram / n-grams, deletion of 
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very frequent words, very rare words, and stop-words that are not 
valuable for the purposes of the study and empty headings after pro-
cessing documents.
 The main assumption of both stages is that each text of the doc-
ument is a collection of words of a corpus vocabulary, the so-called 
Bag of Words. In case of text classification, a word in a document 
is assigned a weight according to its frequency in the document and 
frequency in between different documents.22
To identify the semantic features of the texts (task one), a vector 
model of verbal space (VSM) was used.23,24 VSM was applied to di-
vide the text of documents into lexemes in the form of unigrams and 
bigrams, and to determine the importance (weight) of each lexeme 
in the structure of the document and the collection in general, the 
concept of weighing lexemes was used, i.e. giving more weight to 
unexpected events and less weight to events that occur frequently.25 
The weight is set and, if necessary, regulated by weight indic-
ators, but generally it depends on the number of times it enters the 
document / collection. The study used a family of classical weighing 
indicators, i.e. the absolute frequency n of occurrence in the docu-
ment / collection, the normalized frequency of the word TF (term 
frequency), the inverse frequency of the IDF document database, as 
well as TF-IDF.26
22 George K. Soumya and Joseph Shibily, “Text Classification by Augmenting Bag 
of Words (BOW) Representation with Co-Occurrence Feature,” IOSR Journal of 
Computer Engineering 34, no. 16 (2014): 34–38, https://doi.org/10.9790/0661-
16153438.
23 Steven P. Crain, Ke Zhou, Shuang-Hong Yang and Hongyuan Zha, “Dimensionality 
Reduction and Topic Modeling: From Latent Semantic Indexing to Latent Dirichlet 
Allocation and Beyond,” in Mining Text Data (Boston: Springer, 2012), 129–161.
24 Yin Zhang, Rong Jin and Zhi-Hua Zhou, “Understanding Bag-of-Words Model: A 
Statistical Framework,” International Journal of Machine Learning & Cybernetics 1, 
no. 1 (2010): 43–52, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13042-010-0001-0.
25 Gerard Salton, A. Wong and C. S. Yang, “A Vector Space Model for Automatic 
Indexing,” Communications of the ACM 18, no. 11 (1975): 613–620.
26 George K. Soumya and Joseph Shibily, “Text Classification by Augmenting Bag of 
Words (BOW) Representation with Co-occurrence Feature,” IOSR Journal of Computer 
Engineering 34, no. 16 (2014): 34–38, https://doi.org/10.9790/0661-16153438.
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The relative frequency of the same word use in two subsets of 
the collection is an important characteristic, for example, the figures 
representing which words were more often or less often used by RT 
during the period of Poroshenko’s Presidency in comparison with the 
period of V. Zelensky’s Presidency. To do this, the indicator lor (“log 
odds ratio”) was calculated for each word (see Chapter 7.327 for the 
calculation formula). During the calculations, we considered only the 
words that occurred in the collection at least 10 times.
To identify the association of words in the body of data, i.e. the 
common presence of words in documents / collections and their fre-
quency characteristics, two cases were considered: bigrams (estab-
lished sequences of two words that stand side by side in texts) or 
n-grams (combinations of n words – collocations) and word correl-
ations. “You shall know a word by the company it keeps,”28 in other 
words, by analyzing collocates it is possible to identify the connotat-
ive meanings and reveal the interests of the message producer.
However, bigrams, as the most common pairs of words, give 
some partial idea of the connections between lexemes in the text. The 
correlation of words yields much more information. Correlation is a 
measure of how often words appear together, relative to how often 
they appear separately in documents in an entire data collection.
In texts, word correlation is usually measured in binary form, i.e. 
either the words appear in the document together or they do not. The 
φ (phi) coefficient is the traditional indicator of binary correlation 
(coefficient calculating formulas29). In its interpretation, it is similar 
to the Pearson correlation coefficient: if the absolute value of the φ 
coefficient ranges from 0 to 0.3, it indicates a very small correlation 
or no correlation at all; from 0.3 to 0.7 – a weak correlation; and from 
0.7 to 1.0 – a strong correlation.
27 Julia Silge and David Robinson, Text Mining with R: A Tidy Approach (1st. ed.) 
(Sebastopol: O’Reilly Media, Inc., 2017), https://www.tidytextmining.com/.
28 John Rupert Firth, Papers in Linguistics 1934–1951 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1957): 11.
29 Julia Silge and David Robinson, Text Mining with R: A Tidy Approach (1st. ed.) 
(Sebastopol: O’Reilly Media, Inc., 2017), https://www.tidytextmining.com/.
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We used data visualisation in the form of a network to generalize 
the association’s estimates.
Topic modeling, which belongs to the family of probabilistic 
methods of collection analysis and allows the identification of hid-
den structures (i.e. topics) that generate source documents, was used 
to solve the second task. Topics are a range of phenomena, events, 
and entities that make up the content and structure of the document; 
topics are defined through keywords. 
This paper applies the Structural Topic Model (STM).30 It is a 
generative model of word counts. A pattern is created on the basis 
of document collection in the process of modeling a certain frame-
work, i.e. the structure of topics is defined within a fixed (predeter-
mined) number of topics. This includes the probabilistic distribution 
of words between topics (for each topic the probability of βi belong-
ing of i-word to the topic is determined) as well as the distribution 
of topics in the documents (for each document the probability of γj 
occurrence of  the j-topic in the document is determined), which are 
joined by metadata that further characterize documents. In general, 
each document can consist of several topics, and the word can be a 
key in several topics. The sum of the probabilities of all the topics 
that make up the document is 1, and the sum of the probabilities of 
all the words that make up the topic is also 1.31
In this study, documents (article titles) and a collection of docu-
ments represent a probabilistic mix of topics, as each word in each 
title may belong to a different topic. Topics are described by pro-
portional vectors that indicate the probability (share) of words that 
present the relevant features of this topic. The metadata accompan-
ing each document include the date of publication of the article, the 
number of the subperiod and the sign that identifies the person of the 
President of Ukraine of the relevant subperiod.
30 Margaret E. Roberts, Brandon M. Stewart and Edoardo M. Airoldi, “A Model of 
Text for Experimentation in the Social Sciences,” Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 111, no. 515 (2016): 988–1003.
31 Margaret E. Roberts, Brandon M. Stewart and Dustin Tingley, “stm: R Package for 
Structural Topic Models,” Journal of Statistical Software 10, no. 2 (2014): 1–40.
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The most important as well as the most complex and least defined 
in the STM model is the number of k topics that are to be extracted 
from the text.32 It is calculated before the construction of the model. 
For most real topics modeling tasks, there is no ideal number of top-
ics, and the means of selecting are not clearly defined.33 In our study, 
we used the method of calculating a simple harmonic mean to group 
documents by topic described by M. Ponweiser,34 and the ldatuning 
R package by N. Murzintcev,35 which allows obtaining the optimal 
k by comparing the calculations for the set of k values. Calculations 
were made in the R programming language using such packages as 
ggraph, ggthemes, ldatuning, quanteda, stm, tidytext, topicmodels 
and others.
3. Findings
3.1. Vocabulary structure analysis 
Frequency analysis was conducted to identify the verbal structure of 
RT reports, or rather to identify the set of dominant lexemes and the 
connections between them.
 RT does not provoke the “hypodermic needle effect,” its influ-
ence is not absolute, but due to the citation of its texts and further 
dissemination of materials by other media, it lays the ground for 
wider propaganda activities of other RF subjects and forms frames 
32 Jordan Boyd-Graber, David Mimno and David Newman, “Care and Feeding of Topic 
Models: Problems, Diagnostics, and Improvements,” in Handbook of Mixed Mem-
bership Models and Their Applications, eds. E. M. Airoldi, D. Blei, E. A. Erosheva, & 
S. E. Fienberg (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2014), 3–34.
33 Weizhong Zhao et al., “A Heuristic Approach to determine an appropriate Number 
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of reality perception; RT’s impact, in terms of penetrating the me-
dia space and warping public discourse, derives primarily from the 
secondary circulation its content garners from domestic proxies and 
“useful idiots.”36  
According to Ukrainian researchers, the information and semantic 
specifics of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid warfare, compared to pre-
vious conflicts related to wars of this type, is characterized by its 
(1) intensity and breadth of the audience that the information influ-
ences, reaching global scales, (2) systematic and comprehensive use 
of old and new media, and (3) the creation of a new discourse of war 
aimed at destroying the existing one and forming new interpretive 
and semantic mechanisms of reality perception.37
Top 25 words in Fig. 1 (as well as in Annexes Table A) show how 
the propaganda has adapted to the changing situation in Ukraine. 
It is not surprising that words which often occur denote conflict-
ing states, their capitals, the legislature, leaders, and the population. 
The frequency of other words is connected with the events that took 
place in Ukrainian-Russian relations and with certain “reasons,” hid-
den interests of the RF both in Ukraine and in the West. In particular, 
the top 10 words are connected with the next (pre)conditions and 
reasons:
September – December 2018
• “военные” (the military), “море” (sea): on November 25, 
2018, three ships of the Ukrainian Navy made the transition 
from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov; in the area of the Kerch 
Strait they were stopped by a Russian tanker, attacked by forces 
of the Russian Navy and the Russian Coast Guard, and captured 
by the Russians; 24 sailors were taken prisoners, 6 of them were 
wounded. The Russian side called the incident a provocation 
36 Monoca L. Richter, “The Kremlin’s Platform for ‘Useful Idiots’ in the West: An 
Overview of RT’s Editorial Strategy and Evidence of Impact,” European Values, 2017, 
https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/userfiles/the-kremlin-s-platform-for-useful-idiots-in-
the-west-an-overview-of-rt-s-editorial-strategy.pdf. 
37 Volodymyr Horbulin, ed., Svitova hibrydna viyna: ukrayinsʹkyy front [World Hybrid 
Warfare: Ukrainian Front] (Kyiv: NISD, 2017): 43.
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by Ukraine to gain the support of the US and Europe. Ukraine 
accused Russia of violating the UN Charter and the UN Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea. Reason: in this incident, the 
RF demonstrated to Ukraine who was the “master” of the Sea 
of Azov, provoking Kyiv to reckless steps, which in the future 
could serve as a “motivation to respond” from Moscow; to the 
West it was demonstrated how Russia could easily undermine 
the security of the entire region: 
• “церковь” (church): Ukraine was on the way to receiving the 
Tomos (January 6, 2019) proclaiming the autocephaly of the 
Orthodox Church of Ukraine and its subordination to the Patri-
arch of Constantinople (rather than to Moscow as before); this, 
in turn, provoked sharp criticism and dissatisfaction of the RF; 
pro-Russian forces in Ukraine threatened with further divisions 
in Ukrainian society and a “civil war.” Reason: non-recognition 
of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as a spe-
cific form of struggle against the state independence of Ukraine; 
loss of the opportunity to spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda;
• “положение” (position): 1) elections in the DPR and LPR  – 
representatives of the Ukrainian authorities and the interna-
tional community called the elections illegal and in violation 
of the principles enshrined in the Minsk Agreements. Reason: 
through the elections, Russia retains its influence and control 
over the occupied territories and demonstrates its unwilling-
ness to resolve the conflict peacefully; 2) until December 26, 
2018, the ban on entry for men aged 16 to 60 was imposed in 
Ukraine for the period of martial law in 10 regions. Reason: 
on Ukraine’s part, these were measures to prevent the RF from 
forming detachments of private armies in the Donbass and to 
hinder them in conducting new terrorist operations; Russia re-
acted by accusing Ukraine of human rights violations;
January – April 2019
• “выборы” (elections): the presidential race in Ukraine, March 
31 – the first round of elections, April 30 – the second round 
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and V. Zelensky’s victory. Reason: Ukraine’s presidential race 
allowed the Russian media, including RT, to once again ridicule 
both the process and the candidates; the situation of uncertainty 
and the inconsistency of Zelensky’s image created a wide field 
for discussion, from blatant derision to hopes that the new 
Ukrainian president would be an RF supporter;
• “Донбасс” (Donbass): on January 1, the Treaty on Friendship, 
Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation expired, and Ukraine refused to extend it; in response 
to this, on April 24, V. Putin signed a decree on a simplified pro-
cedure for obtaining Russian citizenship for residents of the oc-
cupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Reason: the 
“passportization” campaign undermines Ukraine’s sovereignty 
and makes it impossible to implement the political part of the 
Minsk Agreements, i.e. Russia had once again demonstrated its 
unwillingness to resolve the conflict in Donbass; 
• “США” (the US): the RF’s extensively cites the US State De-
partment statement on human rights violations in Ukraine as 
well as the words of Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Yu. Lut-
senko, who accused US Ambassador to Ukraine M. Jovanovich 
of interfering in the work of the agency (March) and who also 
accused the US of controlling the whole situation in Ukraine 
during the election campaign; Russia’s violent negative reac-
tion to the US State Department’s statement on supporting a 
democratic, peaceful Ukraine (April). Reason: the “eternal” 
enmity dispute between the RF and the US over dominance in 
the global system of international relations, with Ukraine being 
another basis for mutual accusations;
• “газ” (gas): Naftogaz Ukrainy filed a lawsuit against Russia with 
the permanent chamber of the Arbitration Court in The Hague. 
The company demanded from Moscow to pay 5.2 billion US 
dollars in compensation for the loss of assets in Crimea; the con-
sequent intimidation of Ukrainians by rising gas prices. Reason: 
any compensation or fines that Russia has to pay, or any levied 
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sanctions are perceived by Russia’s political elite as “moral pres-
sure and fraud” and as an undermining of Russia’s power;
May – December 2019
• “Донбасс” (Donbass): beginning with May 2019, Russian Fed-
eration passports begin to be issued in the Donetsk People’s 
Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR); a dis-
cussion of a fake statement about the capture of the DPR and 
LPR territories by Ukrainian troops within a day; extensive 
protests throughout Ukraine against the “Steinmeier formula” 
for resolving the conflict in Donbass; mutual withdrawal of 
troops in some settlements. Reason: demonstration of Ukraine’s 
aggression, its unwillingness to settle the conflict and to “hear 
out” the DNR and LNR;
• “газ” (gas): long and exhausting negotiations with the EU for 
support on the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine. Reason: 
Russia’s desire to impose its financial priorities;
• “новая” (new): adjective-label denoting events and activities 
related to President Zelensky, the  Servant of the People Party 
and the re-elected Verkhovna Rada. Reason: not quite under-
standing what to expect from the President of Ukraine and the 
Verkhovna Rada, RT put different (even contradictory) shades 
of meaning into the adjective: from the approving “expectation 
of new positive relations” to the sarcastic “a new broom sweeps 
clean” attitudes; 
• “Вышинский” (Vyshinsky): K. Vyshinsky, as the head of RIA 
Novosti-Ukraine, a branch of the Russian news agency RIA 
Novosti, was accused by the Security Service of Ukraine of 
treason and creating a subversive, pro-Russian information 
network in Ukraine; arrested in May 2018, in September 2019 
he took part in the exchange of prisoners between Russia and 
Ukraine, after which he arrived in Moscow. Reason: RT gave 
Vyshinsky the image of an unjustly imprisoned martyr and con-
stantly demonstrated its support with the implicit message that 
Russia does not leave its people behind;
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January – April 2020 
• “Донбасс” (Donbass): preparation and subsequent exchange of 
prisoners in April between Ukraine and the “ORDLO” (tem-
porarily occupied territories of Ukraine – certain areas of Don-
etsk and Luhansk oblasts). Reason: the Kremlin demonstrated 
a willingness to reach a compromise; however, that was not 
without political bargaining unfavorable to Ukraine: Russia 
“took” V.Tsemakh, who was to become an important witness in 
the trial in the Netherlands in the case of the crash of the Malay-
sian Boeing in eastern Ukraine;
• “новая” (new): the same linkage as in the previous period. 
However, it should be mentioned that if at the beginning of 
Zelensky’s presidential career the “new” (power) was presented 
with the connotative meaning of “succeeding an old, ineffective 
power,” it gradually came to mean the “ignorant, and therefore 
ineffective” power;  
• “США” (the US): intimidation of Ukrainians by the con-
sequences the country would face upon joining the NATO; criti-
cism of the US for its support to Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank 
missiles (for instance, the Ukrainian authority was labeled as 
“pawns on the American chessboard”; “decline in pro-NATO 
sentiment” was emphasized in the context of a new Military 
Doctrine of Ukraine, which outlined integration in the NATO; 
President Zelensky was criticized for his offer to allow Americ-
ans extract gas and oil in Ukraine) (the reason is the same as in 
January-April 2019); 
• “Майдан” (Maidan): speculation on the ability of the “new” 
power to find the responsible for the shootings on the Maidan in 
February 2014. Reason: to question the political will of both the 
“old” and the “new” authorities in Ukraine to find out the truth; 
• “Китай” (China) was mentioned in connection with COVID-19 
and the protests near the village of Novi Sanzhary, where 
Ukrainian tourists from China were brought to the sanatorium 
for quarantine, and the local population was aggressively dis-
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satisfied. Reason: to portray Ukrainians as aggressive, intoler-
ant, and the power as being incapable of communicating with 
its citizens; 
• “закон” (law): the lexeme does not have any special meaning, it 
is simply often used in the context of describing and analyzing 
the activities of President Zelensky.
Another lexical unit is quite illustrative: the adverb “против” 
(against) (September – December 2018 – 12th position, May – 
December 2019 – 17th position), which demonstrates the whole po-
sition of the RF in relation to Ukraine, its power, politics, and its 
citizens. In other words, Russia is always in opposition to everything 
associated with Ukrainian statehood and independence.
The importance indicator of the words tf-idf enabled to reveal 
the essential characteristics of RT reports due to the reduction of the 
weight of commonly used words. According to tf-idf (Annex Table 
B), in all periods there is a harshly negative anti-Ukrainian discourse, 
either contemptuous, accusatory, or threatening (although with some 
differences). For example, Fig. 2 shows the most distinctive words 
found in the titles of RT reports in two subperiods – a more rigid and 
conflicting discourse of the period of Poroshenko’s Presidency and 
a less conflicting discourse of the period of Zelensky’s Presidency 
(P. Poroshenko – red, V. Zelensky – blue). 
The collocation analysis is even more illustrative, as it shows an 
element of the most important topics of RT analytical reports. 
Bi-, tri-, and quatro-collocations indicate that among the most im-
portant topics for the RF (which are not always explicitly expressed) 
is the topic of Russian gas transportation. For Russia, gas has become 
an instrument of energy diplomacy; in other words, it relies on its 
status as a transporter of Russian gas to put pressure on European 
countries and Ukraine. Energy is the basis of economic growth, 
which can in turn be translated into political power.38 In the case 
38 Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “The Entanglement of Energy, Grand Strategy, and International 
Security,” in The Handbook of Global Energy Policy (Chichester, England: John 
Wiley & Sons, Ltd, May 2013), https://www.belfercenter.org/node/89236.
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of Russia, energy resources are viewed as both a tool and a means 
to achieve not only economic but also security and political goals.39  
A visual representation of the network of relations between 
words, which takes into account both collocations and correlations 
of words, enabled to obtain a general event-thematic picture of the 
entire collection of documents. Fig. 3 shows a simplified version of 
this picture presented in the form of a network created by the most 
common words, the correlation φ between which is higher than 0.7.
This network does not only show the most distinctive words of 
the collection, but also presents how they are related. This is the pre-
39 Zuzanna Nowak, Jarosław Godzimirski and Jakub Ćwiek-Karpowicz, “Russia’s 
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Zelensky 
 
The collocation analysis is even more illustrative, as it shows an element of the most 
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liminary analysis for a deeper thematic modeling. Here we clearly 






Fig. 4. Top-20 collocations (n-grams) in RT reports ( >= 0,7) 
 
This network does not only show the most distinctive words of the collection, but also 
presents how they are related. This is the preliminary analysis for a deeper thematic modeling. Here 
we clearly see three separate thematic subnets of the RT reports: two larger and one smaller. 
The first subnet is a set of purely propagandist patterns used in the materials (their purpose 
is to plan information and legal support for the RF’s actions). The second subnet is more related to 
specific subjects or objects and events. The third subnet is a “mononet” that presents one topic, 
namely the reaction by the Kremlin’s propaganda to the recognition of the autocephaly of the 
Orthodox Church of Ukraine in the world and the events surrounding it.  
 
3.2. Structural analysis of topics 
Since the number of possible topics k is a priori unknown, the possible value of k was analyzed in 
the range from 5 to 50. Based on calculations according to the above procedure, and taking into 
account primarily such criteria as coherence, as well as the simplicity or clarity of interpretation of 
the topic, for further work k = 12 was taken. On the basis of the STM-model 12 topics were built 
and keywords related to them were identified. 
Fig. 4. Top-20 collocations (n-grams) in RT reports (φ >= 0,7)
The first subne  is a set of purely propagandist patterns used in 
the mat rial  (their purpos  is to plan informatio  and legal sup ort 
for the RF’s actions). The second subnet is more related to specific 
subjects or objects and events. The third subnet is a “mononet” that 
presents one topic, namely the reaction by the Kremlin’s propaganda 
to the recognition of the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of 
Ukraine in the world and the events surrounding it. 
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3.2. Structural analysis of topics
Since the number of possible topics k is a priori unknown, the pos-
sible value of k was analyzed in the range from 5 to 50. Based on cal-
culations according to the above procedure, and taking into account 
primarily such criteria as coherence, as well as the simplicity or clar-
ity of interpretation of the topic, for further work k = 12 was taken. 
On the basis of the STM-model 12 topics were built and keywords 
related to them were identified.
 Topic modeling assumes that the topic is a distribution of word 
probabilities, and the most probable words in general can indicate 
the main topic.
Fig. 5 shows the most propaple words for each of the top 12 top-
ics. The topic content should be carefully interpreted on the basis 
of the most probable words, as they represent only a small part of 
the probability distribution and are not necessarily the most exclus-
ive words of the topic. Therefore, in shaping topic content, we had 
to consider other words as well as further analyze the documents 
in which the topic was presented most clearly. Hence, the analysis 
enabled to distinguish the top 12 “hidden” topics in the entire data 
collection:
– Topic 1: Pre-election chaos in Ukraine (mix of topics);
– Topic 2: Steinmeier formula + US support to Ukraine;
– Topic 3: The Kerch Strait incident + “Russophobia”;
– Topic 4: RF citizenship for the residents of DPR and LPR + 
increase in gas prices in Ukraine (mix of topics);
– Topic 5: Termination of the Treaty of Friendship with Russia 
+ Zelensky’s domestic policy (changes + gas);
– Topic 6: Zelensky takes office as President of Ukraine;
− Topic 7: Zelensky’s reforms + evacuation of Ukrainians from 
China (protests in Novi Sanzhary, coronavirus);
− Topic 8: The schism of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine;
− Topic 9: Imposition of martial law in some regions of Ukraine 
+ the combat readiness of Ukraine’s Armed Forces;
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− Topic 10: Aggressive behavior of Ukraine in relation to the 
DNR / LNR + “aggressive” Poroshenko (or Poroshenko’s An-
ti-Rating);
− Topic 11: Support for Vyshinsky;
Since each document can be multi-thematic, it is also possible to 
speak about the connection of topics, i.e. topics are often found in 
joint documents. Fig. 7 shows that all topics can be divided into 4 
groups: 
– monotopic – autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy (topic 8);
– a group of topics related to the Presidency of Poroshenko and 
the Presidential elections (topics 1 and 10);





Fig. 6. Top-12 topics by prevalence: distribution of probability  for each topic  
 
Since each document can be multi-thematic, it is also possible to speak about the connection 
of topics, i.e. topics are often found in joint documents. Fig. 7 shows that all topics can be divided 
into 4 groups:  
–  monotopic – autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy (topic 8); 
–  a group of topics related to the Presidency of Poroshenko and the Presidential 
elections (topics 1 and 10); 
–  events around K. Vyshinsky and the Kerch Strait, which are directly related to 
Russia’s interests / accusations against Russia (topics 3 and 11); 
–  a group of topics that express the interests and expectations of the RF related to V. 
Zelensky as the new President of Ukraine (here in the center are three topics related to (a) V. 
Zelensky as President of Ukraine, his reforms and policies (topics 5, 6 and 7); (b) there are gas 
issues and Russian citizenship for residents of the occupied territories (topics 12 and 4), (c) the 
support for separatists and information support of favorable to Russia conditions to end the conflict 
in the occupied Donbass (topics 9 and 2). 
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– events around K. Vyshinsky and the Kerch Strait, which are 
directly related to Russia’s interests / accusations against Rus-
sia (topics 3 and 11);
– a group of topics that express the interests and expectations of 
the RF related to V. Zelensky as the new President of Ukraine 
(here in the center are three topics related to (a) V. Zelensky 
as President of Ukraine, his reforms and policies (topics 5, 
6 and 7); (b) there are gas issues and Russian citizenship for 
residents of the occupied territories (topics 12 and 4), (c) the 
support for separatists and information support of favorable to 
Russia conditions to end the conflict in the occupied Donbass 




Fig. 7. Thematic network (relations of topics) of the collection ( > 0.1) 
 
Fig. 8 shows the distribution of topics between documents. On each graph, the probability γ, 
which is reflected on the x-axes, varies from 0 to 1 and determines the affiliation of documents to 
this topic. If the column is high near 0 (many documents have a probability γ close to 0), it means 
that we have many documents that do not belong to the relevant topic. If there are many values 
around 1, it means that there are many documents that exclusively represent one topic. These 
distributions demonstrate how a collection of documents presents a defined list of topics. 
Fig. 7. Thematic network (relations of topics) of the collection (φ > 0.1)
Fig. 8 shows the distribution of topics between documents. On 
each graph, the probability γ, which is reflected on the x-axes, varies 
from 0 to 1 and determines the affiliation of documents to this topic. 
If the column is high near 0 (many documents have a probability γ 
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close to 0), it means that we have many documents that do not belong 
to the relevant topic. If there are many values  around 1, it means that 
there are many documents that exclusively represent one topic. These 
distributions demonstrate how a collection of documents presents a 
defined list of topics.
A significant cluster of documents around 0 and a complete lack 
of cluster around 1 are common to all probability distribution graphs 
γ. This means that all topics are present in many documents, i.e. the 
same material is repeated many times, which is typical for propa-
ganda materials. This feature shows as well that the majority of doc-
uments are multi-topic, which is also a sign of propaganda material, 
i.e. due to the diversity of its topics, such material must reach the 
widest possible audience. According to the form of probability dis-
tribution γ topics can be divided into 2 groups: (1) with a short tail 
and (2) with a long tail. The long tail of the probability distribution γ 
for a topic is an indication that the collection contains documents that 
are written on this very topic, i.e. those in which the probability of 
belonging to a given topic is high. A short tail indicates the opposite. 
In the studied collection, the highest probability of one topic reaches 
0.75. According to our observations, the long-tailed form of distribu-
tion is more typical for event / plot topics (which are time-bound – 
given the life cycle of the event), or in cases where there are special 
messages on a given topic in order to emphasize their importance. 
The short-tailed form is typical for topics that can serve as “univer-
sal” additional evidence for many propaganda purposes / campaigns.
In our case, the topics that are present in many documents (the 
range of probability change γ is relatively narrow: from 0 to a max-
imum 0.6) are the following: (5) domestic policy of V. Zelensky, 
(7) reforms of V. Zelensky, (2) Steinmeier formula and the US sup-
port to Ukraine, (3) the Kerch Strait incident and “Russophobia,” 
(6) Zelensky takes office as President of Ukraine. As to other top-
ics, the collection has several publications dedicated to each topic. 
In our opinion, the following topics stand out for their propaganda 
purposes: (10) anti-Poroshenko sentiment, (12) gas, (4) acquisition 
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of RF citizenship by the residents of the occupied territories. Other 
topics in this group are eventful.      
The connection between the topics and the propaganda content 
becomes even more obvious due to use of documents’ metadata, 
which, in our case, include a defined sub-period, as well as inform-
ation about who was the President of Ukraine at the time when the 
document appeared.
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of topics in terms of the periods 
under study:
Table 1. Topics distribution in subperiods
N Topics
Subperiods
1 2 3 4
1 Pre-election chaos in Ukraine (mix of topics) +
2 Steinmeier formula + US support to Ukraine + +
3 The Kerch Strait incident + “Russophobia” + + + +
4 The RF citizenship for the DPR / LPR residents + 
increase in gas prices in Ukraine (mix of topics);
+ + + +
5 Termination of the Treaty of Friendship with Russia 
+ Zelensky’s domestic policy (changes + gas)
+
6 Zelensky takes office as President of Ukraine + +
7 Zelensky’s reforms + evacuation of Ukrainians from 
China (protests in Novi Sanzhary, coronavirus)
+ +
8 The schism of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine + +
9 Imposition of martial law in some regions of Ukraine 
+ the combat readiness of Ukraine’s Armed Forces
+ +
10 Aggressive behavior of Ukraine in relation to 
the DNR / LNR + “aggressive” Poroshenko (or 
Poroshenko’s Anti-Rating)
+ + +
11 Support for Vyshinsky + + +
12 Gas negotiations + +
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Considering the distribution of topics by periods (Fig. 9), all the 
topics can be devided into the following groups:
– relevant all the time – (3), (4) and (10);
– closely related to the goals of propaganda, but intensified only 
in certain periods (situational) – (2), (8), (9) and (11);
– eventful, but which can be used for propaganda purposes – 
(1), (6), (7), (5); 
– expressing the RF economic interests –  (12).
Fig. 10 and 11 present a comparative analysis of Russian pro-
paganda of the subperiods of the Presidency of P. Poroshenko and 
V. Zelensky. Fig. 10 shows that three topics were relevant to both 
Presidents of Ukraine, i.e. (3) the incident in the Kerch Strait and 
“Russophobia,” (4) the acquisition of the RF citizenship and rising 
gas prices, (10) anti-Poroshenko propaganda. These include two 
other topics, that is (11) the arrest of K. Vyshinsky, (2) the settlement 
of the Donbass problem according to the Steinmeier formula and the 
US support for Ukraine. Fig. 11 illustrates that V. Zelensky’s period 
includes topics 6 and 7, which relate primarily to the domestic policy 
of V. Zelensky, while Poroshenko’s period only topics involving 
themes 1 and 8 – the election mix and the autocephaly of the Ukrain-
ian church.
However, thematic models have a number of limitations. Firstly, 
the term “topic” is somewhat ambitious, and thematic models will 
not provide a purely subtle classification of texts. Secondly, thematic 
models can be easily abused if they are misunderstood as an object-
ive reflection of the meaning of the text. These tools can be more 
accurately described as “reading tools.” The results of topic models 
should not be interpreted excessively if the researcher does not have 
significant theoretical vision a priori about the number of topics in 
the collection or if the researcher has carefully checked the results of 
the topic model using both the quantitative and qualitative methods 
described above.
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Fig. 10. Distribution of topics by the number of documents in terms of  the 
Presidencies of P. Poroshenko and V. Zelensky
Fig. 11. Graphical display of topical prevalence contrast 25 
 
 
Fig. 10. Distribution of topics by the number of documents i  terms of  





Fig. 11. Graphical display of topical prevalence contrast 
 
However, thematic models have a number of limitations. Firstly, the term “topic” is 
somewhat ambitious, and thematic models will not provide a purely subtle classification of texts. 
Secondly, thematic models can be easily abused if they are misunderstood as an objective reflection 
of the meaning of the text. These tools can be more accurately described as “reading tools.” The 
results of topic models should not be interpreted excessively if the researcher does not have 
significant theoretical vision a priori about the number of topics in the collection or if the researcher 
has carefully checked the results of the topic model using both the quantitative and qualitative 
methods described above. 
 
Conclusions 
The conducted analysis shows that in 2018–2020, the Kremlin’s propaganda adapted to the 
changing situation in Ukraine and passed several stages. Initially it was focused on the opposition 
between Ukraine and Russia, as well as the role of President Poroshenko and related conflicts – the 
events in the Sea of Azov, the receipt of the Tomos, the support of Ukraine by the US and the EU. 
Then, much less attention was paid to that confrontation, and more was said about the presidential 
election in Ukraine, with the emergence of a somewhat “new” topic – gas transit through Ukraine. 
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Conclusions
The conducted analysis shows that in 2018–2020, the Kremlin’s pro-
paganda adapted to the changing situation in Ukraine and passed sev-
eral stages. Initially it was focused on the opposition between Ukraine 
and Russia, as well as the role of President Poroshenko and related 
conflicts – the events in the Sea of  Azov, the receipt of the Tomos, the 
support of Ukraine by the US and the EU. Then, much less attention 
was paid to that confrontation, and more was said about the presid-
ential election in Ukraine, with the emergence of a somewhat “new” 
topic – gas transit through Ukraine. Later, when V. Zelensky became 
President of Ukraine, the Russian Federation practically disappeared 
from the discussion; it was replaced by a new confrontation between 
Ukraine and Donbass; other topics include the role of the new Pres-
ident V. Zelensky, issues in the gas and oil sectors, and, as absolutely 
expected, the condemnation of Ukrainian nationalist activities.
The RT reports are characterized by their extensive range of top-
ics (12); besides, one report may also cover several topics, which is 
a sign of propaganda. There is also a clear devision regarding the 
attitudes to the Presidents. The period of P. Poroshenko’s Presidency 
was prevailed by “monotopics,” namely church autocephaly, elec-
tions, aggression, RF citizenship for the DPR/LPR population, and 
gas. However, many monotopic reports (devoted to specific events) 
were published during a relatively short period. Evidently, these are 
the most vulnerable topics for the Kremlin; they are directly connec-
ted with the RF’s interests. All the rest of the topics are merely an-
ti-Ukrainian. The period of V. Zelensky’s Presidency is characterized 
by a diversity of topics, these topics should be repeated many times 
to be remembered by the public. This was the period when the Krem-
lin looked for the points of contact with Zelensky. Having failed, 
they returned to the previous scheme: criticism of the President’s 
decisions, Russophobia, gas, aggression, etc. However, the level of 
intolerance for V. Zelensky was (and still remains) much lower in 
comparison with the demonstrated aggression against P. Poroshenko.
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Considering the above, the authors conclude that the propaganda 
of Russia Today does not pursue unique goals, since hatred, humi-
liation, and incitement to aggression have been the features of any 
disruptive media activity. Rather, it demonstrates the position of the 
Kremlin as an offended party, even a vulnerable entity that purpose-
fully takes vengeance on the rival who is presumably a little suc-
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